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Abstract
Motivated by the bubble-collapse cycle witnessed in Japanese as-
set prices since the late 1980s, this paper examines how a …nancial
crisis in‡uences the power of monetary policy. We construct a simple
macroeconomic model based on the microfoundations of Hölmstrom
and Tirole (1997) to analyse the e¤ect of three types of …nancial stress
on the nature of the equilibrium: a credit crunch; an adverse collateral
shock; and a monitoring cost shock. Perhaps surprisingly, we …nd that
the power of monetary policy is, if anything, heightened in a credit
crunch; higher monitoring costs however work in the opposite direc-
tion, suggesting a need for more aggressive stabilisation policy in the
face of …nancial shocks.
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11 Introduction
Why is it, that a decade on from the complete collapse witnessed in as-
set prices, the Japanese economy is still experiencing a “growth recession”
with actual output signi…cantly below capacity? Why is it, that even with
short term nominal interest rates slashed right down to their zero bound,
the Japanese private sector cannot be convinced to spend su¢ciently to …ll
this gap? This paper develops a simple theoretical model to study these
fundamental, yet not – we argue – satisfactorily resolved issues.
The seminal work in this …eld is of course that of Paul Krugman (see
Krugman, 1998 a,b for example), the well-known thesis maintained in these
papers needing no repetition here. It can be argued, however, that this im-
portant and in‡uential research is actually based on the wrong model, there
being at least two aspects which leave students of Japan’s macroeconomic
performance over this period feeling uncomfortable. First, Krugman’s base-
line model focuses entirely on inadequate private sector consumption as the
cause of this weak aggregate demand. A simple eyeballing of the data, how-
ever, strongly suggests weak private business investment as the main culprit.
Now, correlation doesn’t prove causation of course, especially once we
allow for accelerator e¤ects from output onto investment. Nevertheless, a
number of papers, both in academic and policy circles as well as in the …nan-
cial press, support the weak business investment hypothesis. Ramaswamy
and Rendu (2000) for example …nd that adverse shocks to business and res-
idential investment have been the main determinants of the overall growth
slowdown; private consumption shocks according to their results played a
relatively minor role. Similar results are found by Bayoumi (2000), while
Kiyotaki and West (1996) and Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) also focus
their analysis on this component of demand.
A second and equally important issue concerns the plausibility of the liq-
uidity trap-triggering shock1 in Krugman’s framework: a fall in the expected
level of full capacity output. The possibility that demographic change in an
advanced industrial economy may actually cause the production possibility
frontier to shift inwards through time is often regarded with extreme pes-
simism, given historical rates of technical progress and labour productivity
1The lack of a clear consensus among the profession as to the cause of Japan’s present
di¢culties is certainly consistent with the lack of attention this issue has received in most
papers (see for example Krugman, 1999, Bernanke, 2000, Svensson, 2000, McCallum,
2000).
2increases. Besides, why focus on a twenty year demographic shock with such
an obvious alternative candidate at hand, namely the almost seventy percent
fall in the Nikkei 225 Average (at the time of writing, the Nikkei has plum-
meted to a sixteen year low of 11,819) over the last decade or so and the
equally precipitous collapse witnessed in land prices?
If we take these shortcomings seriously, the pressing question from a
macroeconomic policy viewpoint is this: is it the case of wrong model, right
message, or does the appropriateness of an in‡ation targeting policy require
a radical rethink? This paper attempts to address these issues within the
context of an asymmetric information model of the credit market with credit
constraints and balance sheet e¤ects. The central message can easily be con-
veyed in simple IS-LM terms. In an asymmetric information framework, the
position and slope of the economy’s IS curve can generally be in‡uenced by
…nancial factors2. Under such conditions, it is not hard to imagine how a
massive correction in asset values, weakening the capital positions of both
borrowers and lenders, could shift IS (drawn as a function of the safe real
interest rate) leftwards, causing the low interest rate-low output conjuncture
currently seen in Japan.
The paper also examines the issue of whether monetary policy - by which,
in this paper I mean policy aimed at adjusting real interest rates, be it
through nominal interest rate targeting combined with price stickiness, or
when nominal interest rates hit their zero ‡oor, through in‡ation targeting -
retains its e¤ectiveness in in‡uencing demand in the face of such a shock. It
often appears to be taken for granted in the literature that the e¤ectiveness of
this instrument is necessarily reduced by a …nancial shock (see Ramaswamy
and Rendu (2000) for example), or in the limit, that …nancial stress can be
a distinct cause of monetary impotence (Hutchinson, 2000).
Such a debate is fundamentally about the slope of the IS schedule: a
steeper or in the limit vertical IS being consistent with the preceding state-
ments. Contrary to our prior, we …nd that a credit crunch actually increases
the sensitivity of investment to a change in the safe rate implying a ‡attening
of IS, while an adverse shock to …rm capital leaves the slope unchanged. Nei-
ther phenomenon it seems provides an explanation of monetary impotence
per se. An increase in the severity of the informational asymmetry on the
other hand tends to make IS steeper.
Based on the microfoundations of Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997), we con-
struct a simple partial equilibrium macroeconomic model to analyse the ef-
fects of di¤erent types of …nancial stress on the nature of the equilibrium.
2A result noted, though not formally modelled, by Bernanke and Lown (1991) and
Hayakawa and Maeda (2000).
3With its emphasis on the role of net worth when both entrepreneurs and
banks are subject to moral hazard problems vis-à-vis their respective lenders,
this model provides a convenient analytical framework for studying the ef-
fects of a bubble collapse on business investment. A model related to ours,
but with a very di¤erent perspective, is that of Repullo and Suarez (1999).
The authors model monetary policy in a Hölmstrom and Tirole-type envi-
ronment (albeit with a slightly richer moral hazard speci…cation) similar to
ours, although they do not assess how …nancial shocks e¤ect the power of
this policy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.1 begins by out-
lining in some detail Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997); readers already familiar
with this model may wish to skip directly to Section 2.2, which describes
the monetary transmission mechanism. The key results of the paper are pre-
sented in section 2.3 while section 3 concludes. A general characterisation of
the IS equation is contained in Appendix A, Appendix B detailing proofs of
the main propositions.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 An Outline of the Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997)
Model of Financial Stress
The model has three types of agents: …rms; …nancial intermediaries (which,
for our purposes, can be thought of as banks); and investors, all assumed to
be risk neutral with limited liability.
Firms In the real sector, there exists a continuum of …rms, each endowed
with a risky project of size I. Firms di¤er only in their capital endow-
ments3, A, as described by the density function f (A) on the support [0;A max],
Amax <I ; I ¡ A therefore being the quantity of external …nance required.
The revenue generated (assumed to be common knowledge) by a success-
ful investment is R, while that on a failure is zero. Firm’s manager’s face
a moral hazard problem: three versions of the project are open to selection,
each o¤ering di¤erent degrees of non-veri…able private bene…t to the manager
(independently of whether the project succeeds or not), 0, b, B (B>b>0),
with associated probabilities of success in the investment of pH, pL,a n dpL
(¢p ´ pH ¡ pL); managers may therefore deliberately choose to reduce the
probability of success in order to enjoy this private bene…t, or put di¤erently,
3A …rm’s capital endowment takes the form of cash, or any type of asset that can serve
as collateral.
4the project selection decision is non-contractable by assumption. Notice that
this structure implies that the …rm’s managers will always prefer project-B
to project-b when choice in not observed.
Financial Intermediaries The …nancial sector consists of a large number
of banks, whose function it is to monitor …rms and thereby alleviate the moral
hazard described above. Speci…cally, it is assumed that monitoring by a bank
eliminates the B-projects available to the …rm’s managers, thus reducing their
opportunity cost of acting diligently. Monitoring however is privately costly
for the bank: elimination of the B-project entails the non-veri…able cost c
(c>0) and so each bank faces a moral hazard problem of its own. This
moral hazard problem on the supply-side of the credit market requires the
bank to inject some of its own capital into the project, and the endogenously
determined rate of return on these funds, ¯, will have to be su¢ciently high in
order for the bank to have the correct incentives to monitor. The aggregate
quantity4 of bank, or “informed”, capital Km, assumed to be exogenous5,
then becomes an important constraint on the level of aggregate investment.
Uninformed Investors Finally, “uninformed” investors - de…ned as a
group by their inability to access the monitoring technology available to
banks - have access to a safe alternative investment, the gross rate of return
on which is denoted rB. For our purposes, we will assume that this alternative
investment possibility takes the form of a government securities market, rB
then being the one period gross real interest rate on this asset. We will also
assume that rB is …xed, determined exogenously by monetary policy.
4The distribution of bank capital, on the other hand, is completely irrelevant to the
equilibrium in this framework as the returns on all projects are perfectly correlated. Drop-
ping this unrealistic assumption would permit better capitalised banks to bene…t by di-
versifying their portfolios.
5Assuming a perfectly inelastic supply of informed capital may seem at odds with the
perfectly elastic supply of uninformed capital at each rB. Such a restriction, however
may be entirely appropriate during a period of severe …nancial distress. Kanaya and Woo
(2000) document the di¢culties faced by many leading Japanese banks in increasing their
capital base following the crisis (pp14-15):
“...between 1992 and 1997, only Sakura, Daiwa, Tokai and Mitsubishi were able to raise
tier 1 capital in the market...But by 1997, following the sharp decline in bank stocks and
consecutive downgrades by rating agencies of even the best banks, banks suspended any
further attempts to raise capital in the market...Almost all banks issued subordinated debt,
partly to compensate for the decline in tier 2 capital caused by the drop in unrealised pro…ts
of securities holdings...But even subordinated debt issues fell out of favour with investors
by 1997 when the risk in the subordination became apparent.”
5Assumption 1: Given rB, only the good project by assumption has
a positive net present value, even after including the private bene…t of the
…rm’s manager:
pHR ¡ rBI>0 >p LR ¡ rBI + B (1)
Firms can choose to …nance their project by either issuing bonds (“direct”
…nance) or by means of a bank loan (“indirect” …nance)6.
2.1.1 Direct Finance
In the case of direct …nance, an optimal contract will involve the …rm invest-
ing all its funds A with bondholders putting up the remainder I¡A; the …rm
and bondholders being paid Rf and Ru respectively (Rf + Ru = R)i nt h e
case of success, and neither party being paid at all if the project fails. Given
1, a necessary condition for the existence of direct bond …nance is that the
…rm’s managers choose the good project, an outcome that can be secured by
the following incentive constraint:




Intuitively, the …rm’s managers must take a big enough piece of the ac-
tion relative to the private bene…t achieved through shirking. Equation 2
thus implies an upper bound to the expected return the …rm’s managers can
promise to bondholders, and, given the opportunty cost to these investors
of investing in real assets, this in turn places an upper bound on the total
amount of uninformed capital that the …rm can attract






¸ (I ¡ A)rB (3)
The maximum expected return that can be o¤ered to uninformed in-
vestors consistent with the …rm not shirking – the “pledgeable expected in-
come” as Hölmstrom and Tirole put it – cannot be less than the opportunity
cost of these funds to ensure participation by the uninformed. Rearranging
equation 3, we …nd that only su¢ciently capitalised …rms can …nance their















A …rm’s capital endowment must at least cover the project cost less the
discounted pledgeable expected income.
6To keep the corporate …nancing side of the model to its bare essentials, we preclude
the possibility of …rms issuing equity.
62.1.2 Indirect Finance
Firms whose capital endowment fails to satisfy the above condition can ap-
ply for intermediated credit, by means of a bank loan. There is an extensive
theoretical literature stressing theo informational advantages banks are likely
to have over ther investors, the standard rationale being that control of the
debtor is less e¤ective under bond …nance because the dispersion of claim
holders generates free-rider problems and wasteful multiplication of moni-
toring costs (Diamond, 1984). In the context of the present model, the real
service performed by the banking system is the elimination through some ex-
ternal control mechanism of the large (B) private bene…t obtainable through
shirking; put di¤erently, intermediated …nance reduces the opportunity cost
to the …rm of acting diligently, permitting the …rm to credibly promise to
give away a larger piece of the action.
In the case of intermediated …nance, an optimal contract will involve the
…rm investing all its funds A, the bank investing Im with bondholders putting
up the remainder I ¡A¡Im; bondholders, the bank and the …rm being paid
Ru;R m and Rf respectively (Ru +Rm +Rf = R) in the case of success, and
none of the parties being paid at all if the project fails. The minimum return





Whether or not a bank has actually monitored a …rm is non-veri…able ie.
uninformed investors are not a party to this information. A further necessary
condition required for the existence of intermediated …nance therefore is that
the bank chooses to monitor the …rm




We can now proceed in an analogous fashion to that described above
to show that a necessary and su¢cient condition for the existence of bank
…nance is that







¸ (I ¡ A ¡ Im)rB (7)
As before, the pledgeable expected income, which in this case is the max-
imum expected return that can be o¤ered to uninformed investors so that
neither the …rm nor the bank shirks, cannot be less than the opportunity
cost of these funds to ensure participation by the uninformed. Rearranging
7the preceding weak inequality, we …nd the minimum capital requirement for




















What determines the size of the monitor’s capital injection into each
project? Firstly, note the relationship between this capital injection and its








Competition amongst intermediaries will drive the expected return down
to the minimum level compatible with incentives to monitor - the zero pro…t
condition - and the above expression will hold as an equality. Notice that,
perhaps surprisingly, each …rm being monitored accepts an informed capital
injection of equal size, independently of its own collateral level. A marginal
increase in the bank’s capital injection actually causes the share of the project
that the …rm can credibly promise to the uninformed to shrink by a greater
amount, thus raising the minimum capital level a …rm needs to invest7; put
di¤erently, monitoring capital is relatively expensive and so it will always be
optimal for a …rm to minimise its reliance on such a form of …nance.
The minimum capital requirement for a …rm to access bank …nance can























Comparing expressions 4 and 10, it is straighforward to see that a neces-
7It is straightforward to show that a marginal increase in Im reduces the pledgeable
expected income from a project by ¯. Di¤erentiating, we …nd that dA=dIm = ¯=rB¡1 > 0.
8sary and su¢cient condition for monitoring to be socially useful8 is
A(rB) >A (rB;¯;c) (11)








For monitoring to appear in equilibrium then, its cost cannot be “too”
large. For our purposes, it turns out to be useful if c is also bounded below by
B¡b. Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997) also make such an assumption, justifying
it on the grounds that were it not to be the case, monitoring would allow a
…rm to raise more uninformed capital than without monitoring (compare 4
and 10 to see this). Under such conditions, there could be an equilibrium
with monitoring even if intermediaries possessed no own capital. In what
follows, such a restriction is required to ensure that loan rates fall following
an easing of monetary policy in our benchmark model. These restrictions are










For all c satis…ying these restictions, we can classify …rms into three cat-
egories according to their capital endowment: well-capitalised …rms, A ¸
A(rB), can …nance their investment by issuing bonds directly to uninformed
investors; mid-capitalised …rms, A(rB;¯;c) · A<A(rB), are obliged to
use a mix of intermediated capital and bonds; while under-capitalised …rms,
A<A(rB;¯;c), are excluded from the capital market altogether.
With an exogenous safe real interest rate, equilibrium in the capital mar-
ket is then fully described by equalising the demand for and the stock of






Condition 11 must hold for all values of ¯ and rB such that ¯>¯´
pH
pL rB,w h e r e a s
the above condition holds only for the lowest feasible value of ¯.N o w ,f o re a c hrB, b c is
decreasing in ¯ Surely c<e c then is purely a necessary condition? The true necessary and
































To summarise the model: the …nancial health of both …rms and interme-
diaries is exogenously given, as is the safe real interest rate, which we as-
sume is controlled indirectly by the monetary authority; banks’ monitoring
costs are also exogenous, but for intermediated …nance to appear in equi-
librium these must be bounded; the rate of return on bank capital is en-
dogenously determined, and this plus the other variables/densities described
above yield the cut-o¤ capital endowments required to access the credit mar-
kets.
2.2 Aggregate Investment and the Monetary Trans-
mission Mechanism
Aggregating investment across …rms that are su¢ciently well capitalised to






















Equation 15 can be thought of as a micro-founded IS curve linking aggre-
gate investment to the safe real interest rate Di¤erentiating (see Appendix A
for a detailed derivation), we can write the slope of the function, the response















































10Two distinct elements determine the response of investment to a change
in safe real interest rates in the model:
² …rstly, for a given ¯, a higher opportunity cost of investing in real
assets will raise the required return demanded by uninformed investors,
a return that only better capitalised …rms will be in a position to o¤er
without destroying incentives. This e¤ect can be interpreted as the
broad credit (or balance sheet) channel of monetary transmission (see
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, for an overview), operating here through
the discounted pledgeable expected income and A(rB;¯;c), rather than
directly through …rm assets, f (A).
² secondly, there will be an endogeous response from ¯ itself, as the
number of …rms spanned by intermediation (and thus the demand for
bank …nance) will change following the change in the safe rate. This
is broadly interpretable as a bank lending channel, albeit one work-
ing through the demand rather than supply side of this market, à la
Bernanke and Blinder (1988).
To be clear then, we are excluding from our analysis the possibility that
monetary policy can directly a¤ect …rm assets, f (A) and/or the quantity of
intermediary capital, Km. A monetary tightening induces a ‡ight-to-quality
e¤ect, whereby the …rms with the weakest balance sheets in both capital
markets are …nd themselves excluded. In the bond market, such …rms will
switch to bank …nance, while in the market for intermediated …nance, such
…rms will be unable to obtain credit from any source.
It is important to realise that in the full information case, where pH is
fully contractable, aggregate investment in this economy would be indepen-
dent of changes in the safe real interest rate. This result follows directly
from the …xed investment scale adopted, coupled with assumption 1: all
good investment projects have positive NPV and hence all will get …nanced,
regardless of the internal capital positions of …rms. The marginal e¢ciency





I and 0 otherwise.
Inspecting equation 16, it is clear that the (up-until-now unspeci…ed)
density function of …rm assets, f, plays a crucial role in determining the
slope of IS. For one thing, it is impossible to determine ap r i o r ithe direction
of this economy’s bank lending channel, as this result depends crucially upon
the mass of …rms requiring intermediated …nance after the fall in safe rates.
Furthermore, f plays a more direct role in the slope expression in that it
11t r a n s l a t e st h ei m p a c to fc h a n g e si nt h es a f er a t eo nA(rB;¯;c) into the
response of aggregate investment: if the con…guration of A(rB;¯;c) and f
are such that few …rms are brought into the capital market by an interest rate
reduction, then the consequent impact on aggregate investment spending will
be less.
Despite this ambiguity, it is possible to show that the relationship between
aggregate investment and the safe real interest rate in the model is always
negative as one would expect (see Appendix A for a proof). Without specify-
ing f, however, it is not possible to go further and fully characterise the shape
of IS. For this reason, if we are to make any progress towards the goal of the
paper, it will be necessary to remove this source of ambiguity by specifying f:
an obvious benchmark candidate is to assume that …rm assets are uniformly
distributed9, implying f (Ai)=f (Aj) 8Ai;A j 2 [0;A max]. Though clearly
unrealistic, such a choice allows us to focus on more fundamental aspects of
the model.









































The proceeding analysis will use this model to examine the macroeconomic
implications of three types of …nancial stress: a credit crunch, de…ned as a
fall in the exogenous stock of aggregate bank capital10; an adverse collateral
9Interesting implications (and avenues for future research) of relaxing the uniform-asset
distribution assumption include discontinuties and non-monotonicity in the second deriva-
tive of IS: the economy will then display asymmetric responses to interest rate changes
and small changes in interest rates can have larger-than-anticipated e¤ects. Taken from
Walsh (1998), p.268: “A rise in interest rates may have a much more contractionary im-
pact on the economy if balance sheets are already weak, introducing the possibility that
nonlinearities in the impact of monetary policy may be important.”
10This de…nition is identical to that found in Bernanke and Lown (1991), who de…ne the
term as “...a signi…cant leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans, holding constant
both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers”. As in their paper,
equilibrium credit rationing should by no means be considered a necessary condition for a
credit crunch here. The mapping between this de…nition and the meaning of the term as
most observers conventionally understand it, however, was diputed by Friedman (1991) in
h i sc o m m e n t so nt h ea b o v ep a p e r :“ I doubt, however, that a simple leftward shift of loan
supply...would qualify as a credit crunch in the mind of the typical market participant or
monetary policymaker. It is also no conincidence that the widespread anecdotal evidence to
12shock, reducing the cash assets of those …rms capable of tapping capital
markets for funds; and …nally, an increase in the severity of informational
asymmetry, proxied by an increase in bank’s monitoring costs. For each type
of shock, particular attention will be paid to a) displacements in the position
of IS and b) the e¤ect on the slope of IS.
Motivating these comparative statics exercises is the bubble-collapse cycle
in asset prices witnessed in Japan since the late 1980s. The real e¤ects of this
cycle have been well documented elsewhere in the literature (see Fleming,
1999, for example); for an interesting discussion of the link between asset
prices and bank capital see Ito and Sasaki (1998). Higher monitoring costs
can be justi…ed on the grounds that cash ‡ow becomes a poorer signal of type
during an economic downturn. The main results of this paper are summarised
in the following three propositions.
2.3.1 Credit Crunch
Proposition 2 An exogenous reduction in the aggregate stock of monitoring
capital, Km will: (i) result in a leftward shift of the IS curve, reducing the
level of aggregate investment at each safe real interest rate; and (ii) when cash
assets are uniformly distributed across the set of …rms, raise the sensitivity
of investment spending with respect to the real interest rate.
The proof of part (i) is straightforward and follows directly from the





























¯ ¡ (b + c ¡ B)
´ (21)
when f (¢) is uniform. Notice also that the relationship between aggregate
investment and monitoring capital is concave, implying that a credit crunch
which Bernanke and Lown refer includes many examples of borrowers who have been asked
to wind up their loans despite having kept their accounts fully current, or new projects that
U.S. lenders have simply declined to …nance at any interest rate”.
13will have a bigger impact on demand when occuring in an environment where
bank capital is already weak. Intuitively, this is caused by the convexity in
the demand function for monitoring capital.
Appendix B contains a proof of the interesting and perhaps unexpected














¯ ¡ (b + c ¡ B)
i3 > 0
The intuition is once again given by the convexity of Dm (rB;¯;c):w h e n
supply falls, equilibrium in the market for monitoring capital necessarily oc-
curs at a steeper point on the demand schedule, and as such, the equilibrium
response of ¯ to a change in rB is consequently bigger. A given cut in safe
rates will thus give more …rms access to the capital market and hence the
e¤ect on overall investment will be larger. A credit crunch, it seems, can
always be o¤set by looser monetary policy, unless, of course, a liquidity trap
has occurred; put di¤erently, such a phenomenon cannot by itself explain
monetary impotence.
2.3.2 Adverse Collateral Shock
Proposition 3 For concreteness, imagine a negative shock to the distribu-
tion of …rms’ assets, producing a post-shock distribution g (A) ´ f (A + ±)
for some positive constant, ±. Such a shock will: (i) shift the IS curve left-
ward, resulting in a lower level of investment for each safe real interest rate;
and (ii) when cash assets are uniformly distributed across the set of …rms,
and ±<A max ¡ A(rB) (ensuring the set of …rms spanned by intermediation
post-shock is non-empty), leave the interest sensitivity of investment spending
unchanged.
The proof of part (i) of this proposition is also straightforward: post-
shock, clearly the integral on the right hand side of 15 will span strictly fewer
…rms. Notice that with uniformly distributed assets, the drop in aggregate
investment in linear in the magnitude of the shock, ±11. Part (ii), is also
straightforward: provided the set of …rms spanned by intermediation is non-
empty, the slope expression 18 is independent of ±.




Ig(A)dA = Ig(A)(Amax ¡ ± ¡ A)
142.3.3 Monitoring Cost Shock
Proposition 4 An increase in the cost, c, banks face when eliminating the
B-project will: (i) shift the IS curve leftward; but (ii) when cash assets are
uniformly distributed across the set of …rms, the e¤ect on the interest sensi-
tivity of investment spending is ambiguous.
Proofs of both parts to this proposition are contained in Appendix B.
The intuition for part (i) is as follows. Following the shock, each bank will
require a greater proportion of the total surplus generated to cover the higher
costs of monitoring, implying a corresponding drop in the share that each
…rm can credibly o¤er to outside investors and consequently the amount of
external …nance that can raised; A thus goes up. It turns out also that the

















is convex (a proof of this is also contained in Appendix B). The nonlinearity
here occurs because
d¯
dc is a non-monotonic function of c. Higher monitoring
costs have two con‡icting e¤ects on the aggregate demand for bank capital,
Dm: on the one hand, for a given rB, ¯ and Km, A unambiguously rises
following an increase in c, implying that the integral on the right hand side
of equation 14 spans strictly fewer …rms; on the other, however, each …rm
being monitored post-shock will require a greater informed capital injection,
and so the overall e¤ect @Dm
@c is ambiguous. As shown in Appendix B,
d¯
dc > 0
for c<c ¤ and
d¯
dc · 0 for c ¸ c¤ where c¤ ´ 1
2(1¡
rB
¯ ) (B ¡ b) ie. either c¤
2
µ






,o rc¤ <B¡ b, implying that most or all of the
set of permissible c values will yield
d¯





< 0.T h i s
explains the convexity of our earlier relationship: as c increases, the e¤ect on
K is diminishing as the increase in ¯ gets smaller, indeed ¯ will eventually
decrease.
Although formally speaking, the e¤ect of a monitoring cost shock on dK
drB is
ambiguous, it turns out that for all intents and purposes, investment becomes
more sensitive to interest rates and the IS curve becomes steeper following
a shock. A complete characterisation of this relationship under uniform f is














¯ ¡ (b + c ¡ B)
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(b + c ¡ B)
3 ¡ 7c¯ (b + c ¡ B)
2 +1 0 c











> 0 (steeper IS) for over three-quarters of the range of per-
missible c values;
² and just to give an order of magnitude to the analysis, the value of the
cubic © at the local maximum is 0:061
c3r2
B




local minimum: the maximum amount of steepeing therefore dwarfs
maximum amount of ‡attening by a ratio of 65:1.






is a result of con‡icting e¤ects from the cost
of capital and bank lending channels of monetary policy. The power of the
former, which operates through the discounted pledgeable expected income,
is always diminished by an increase in monitoring costs. This e¤ect, it can be
shown (see Appendix B), is partially and at the extreme, completely o¤set
by an increase in the strength of the latter.
2.3.4 Relative Magnitude of Slope E¤ects
It is instructive to examine what happens to these slope e¤ects highlighted
above for di¤erent parameterisations of the model. Recall that c is (strictly)
bounded below by B ¡ b and above by
crB
¯ .T o b e g i n w i t h , c o n s i d e r w h a t























The ‡attening of the IS curve in a credit crunch disappears, while the
steepening of IS caused by a monitoring cost shock is maximised.

























































In this latter case, it is now the steepening of IS caused by increased c
that vanishes; conversely, the ‡attening of IS in a credit crunch is maximised
as c approaches its upper bound.
A possible interpretation of these results is that the IS curve derived
from the Hölmstrom Tirole model displays two general types of equilibrium
properties. For low values of (b + c ¡ B) relative to
crB
¯ (implying a low
c), credit crunches have no signi…cant slope e¤ect whereas monitoring cost
shocks lead to signi…cant steepening. When (b + c ¡ B) is high relative to
crB
¯ on the other hand, the results are reversed and credit crunches lead to
a signi…cant ‡attening of IS whereas monitoring cost shocks have little slope
e¤ect. Which e¤ect is predominant in Japan at present can only be resolved
empirically.
3 Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued that an asset price correction of the magnitude
witnessed in Japan, which weakens the capital positions of both borrowers
and lenders, represents a more plausible shock as the trigger of the current low
interest rate-low output conjuncture in that country. Perhaps surprisingly,
we …nd that the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy is not necessarily diminished
by such a shock; indeed, in a credit crunch, it is actually heightened, while
17…rm collateral shocks leave it unaltered. Both shocks, it seems, can always
be o¤set by looser monetary policy, unless, of course, a liquidity trap has
occurred; put di¤erently, neither phenomenon provides an explanation of
monetary impotence per se. Monitoring cost shocks, on the other hand,
tend to make IS steeper bringing in to question the suitability of Krugman’s
in‡ation targeting remedy. We can broadly characterise two “regimes”: when
costs are low, factors steepening the IS curve predominate, whereas when
costs are high, factors which ‡atten IS win-out. The clear policy implication
is that debt write-o¤s and bank recapitalisation are to be encouraged, and
should help boost demand in the short run.
4 Appendix A
4.1 Some Useful Expressions Evaluated
This section evaluates some of the key expressions in the model for use in
the proceeding proofs.







































































(b + c ¡ B)
rB
¸






























































How does ¯ change with rB? ¯ is implicitly determined by the market











































, an expression which in general will vary with


























¯ (b + c ¡ B)
> 0
19using the property that the area under a uniform density function between
the limits A and A is simply
R A





For any f, plugging in the evaluated derivates, is it straightforward to



















































Assuming uniform f implies that we can write the derivative of this w.r.t.

















































































pHc(b + c ¡ B)
2cr2
B¢p ¡ rB¯¢p(b + c ¡ B)
¸




B¢p ¡ rB¯¢p(b + c ¡ B)
¤¡2











B¢p ¡ rB¯¢p(b + c ¡ B)]
2 < 0





























5.2 Monitoring Cost Shocks
5.2.1 Proof of dK
dc < 0











































whose sign appears indeterminate. Plugging these evaluated derivatives,
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¯ ¡ (b + c ¡ B)
i > 0
It follows immediately that
d2A









For uniform f, we can write the derivative of the slope of IS w.r.t. a small

















































The second term, however, is a somewhat tougher nut to crack. Plugging




































pHc(b + c ¡ B)
2cr2









[(b + c ¡ B)pH + pHc][2cr2
B¢p ¡ rB¯¢p(b + c ¡ B)]
¡pHc(b + c ¡ B)
£
2¢pr2







BpH ¡ ¯¢prBpH (b + c ¡ B)




B¢p ¡ rB¯¢p(b + c ¡ B)]
2
whose sign appears to depend in part on the sign of
d¯
dc. Plugging in this



















2c2rB ¡ ¯ (b + c ¡ B)
2 +























































































2 (b + c ¡ B) ¡
¯c
rB
















¯ ¡ 2c2 (b + c ¡ B) ¡
¯c




We are now in a position to evaluate the e¤ect of an increase in monitoring



























2 (b + c ¡ B) ¡
¯c
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¯ ¡ 2c2 (b + c ¡ B) ¡
¯c






























(b + c ¡ B)
3 ¡ 7c¯ (b + c ¡ B)
2 +1 0 c





= pH¢p©(b + c ¡ B)




(b + c ¡ B)
3 ¡ 7c¯ (b + c ¡ B)
2 +1 0 c












If (A)pH¢p©(b + c ¡ B)
[2cr2


























= ¡sgnf©(b + c ¡ B)g
The roots of this cubic polynomial are:
(b + c ¡ B)1 =
crB
¯
















24and the turning points are:






















the former being the local minimum and the latter being the local maxi-
mum.
Just to give an order of magnitude to this analysis, the value this cubic
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